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This paper documents large racial differences in the child penalty. Following first childbirth, 
Black women experience a significantly smaller reduction in labour supply, compared to white 
women. Most of the racial differences cannot be explained by economic and demographic 
variables, except household non-labour income. Furthermore, such racial difference widens 
when controlling for maternal years of schooling, occupation and industries. Finally, it shows 
that racial difference in child penalty is not correlated with the racial difference in gender 
norms. 
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1. Introduction 
Parenthood has long been considered a major cause of gender inequality in the labour market. 
Using event-study analysis, influential work by Kleven et al. (2019a) shows that the earnings 
between men and women immediately and substantially diverge after first childbirth and that 
the gender earning gap remains persistent ever since. Across country analysis shows that the 
magnitude of child penalty is correlated with gender norms (Kleven et al., 2019b). Furthermore, 
recent research shows that neither biological factor (Kleven et al., 2021a) nor parental leave 
policies (Kleven et al., 2021b) can explain the child penalty. Social norms are considered a key 
potential to determine child penalty. 
However, racial difference in child penalty is largely overlooked in the literature1. Even within 
the same country, child penalty is likely to differ substantially by race, because racial difference 
in gender norms is substantial. For example, most historians argue that gender norms for black 
households in the US have been substantially less conservative compared to that for white 
counterparts.  
Therefore, this paper use event-study decomposition to examine whether the child penalty 
differs between black and white women. First, I find substantial racial difference in child 
penalty in annual earnings, labour force participation and annual hours worked. Child penalty 
for black women is significantly smaller than that for white women. 
Second question is what explains the striking difference in child penalty by race. As economic 
and demographic situation are different between black and white population, I employ inverse 
probability weighting methods to construct nearly identical distribution of economic variables 
between black and white women. 
The first set of such control variables are female wage (prior childbirth), husband labour 
income (which also control for being single or having an unemployed husband) and household 
non-labour income. These three variables are the three determinants of female labour supply 
model from a unitary household maximisation problem.  
 
1 The only exceptions are several papers in sociology, such as Waldfogel (1997) and Glauber (2007), documenting 
the insignificant coefficient of the interaction term between a dummy of being Black and a dummy of having a 
child under age 6 in a pooled OLS regression with log hourly wage as the dependent variable, using women-only 
sample.  
The second set of such control variables are female year of schooling, occupation and 
industries, as racial difference in child penalty may result from differences in work-related 
preference from occupations, industries, or years of schoolings. 
The third control variable is husband attitude against wife working to investigate if racial 
difference in gender norm can explain the racial gap in child penalty. 
As a result, the racial difference in child penalty virtually unchanged after controlling for her 
prior childbirth wage and her husband labour income. However, the long-term gap in child 
penalty between black and white women is narrowed after the household non-labour income 
distribution is controlled for. 
Second, the racial gap in child penalty widens once we control for women’s occupation, 
industry, or year of schooling prior to childbirth. This suggests that controlling for work-related 
preference and utility gain, the racial difference in child penalty is even larger between black 
and white women. 
Third, controlling for racial difference in gender norms do not change the racial gap in child 
penalty. 
Fourth, heterogeneous analysis shows that racial gap in child penalty remain unchanged when 
controlling for home ownership or family structure. This is important, as recent study finds that 
the death of grandmothers significantly affects the magnitude of the child penalty (Miguel, 
2021). Therefore, I use sample with home ownership at childbirth or use sample who never had 
friends, relatives, grandparents lived within the household. Results suggests that racial 
difference in child penalty is not driven by racial difference in necessity of work to pay monthly 
rent or by racial difference in household structure with informal help within families. 
Section 2 documents related literature. Section 3 explains data and methods. Section 4 present 
results in event study decomposition. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
2.1 Child penalty 
Parenthood has long been considered a major cause of gender inequality in the labour market. 
Influential work by Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2019) uses event-study analysis to show 
how immediately and substantially the earnings diverge between men and women after first 
childbirth and how persistent the gender earning gap remains ever since.  
Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2021) demonstrate that biological factors do not contribute to 
such child penalty which is similar among women having a biological child or adoptive child. 
Furthermore, child penalty is found not have changed in Austria over 60 years despite 
substantial expansions of parental leave policies (Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer and 
Zweimüller, 2021) 
Once again, social norms are suggested as a key candidate for future research to establish 
causality (Kleven et al., 2019a; 2019b; 2021). 
To the best of my knowledge, the racial perspective in the child penalty has not been explored 
in economic research. However, in sociology, Waldfogel (1997) and Glauber (2007) points out 
that black women do not have a motherhood wage penalty2 that is substantial for white women.  
2.2 Social norms and female labour supply 
This article is also related to a recent and growing labour literature that studies the relationship 
between gender norms and female labour outcomes. For example, Bertrand, Cortes, Olivetti 
and Pan (2021) investigate how gender attitudes intermediate between female human capital 
and the marriage gap. Moreover, Nava, Bandiera, Minni, and Quintas-Martínez (2021) quantity 
social stigma in gender identities to explain the cross-country gender wage gap. In addition, 
Field, Pande, Rigol, Schaner, and Moore (2021) use randomised control trials to show that 
gender norms constrain female employment in the private sector in India. 
2.3 Racial difference in gender norms 
Historians provide two views on why black households have developed less conservative 
gender norms.  
First, slavery may have undermined the conservative gender identities in black households 
(Davis, 1981). The slavery system may have changed the ideology of womanhood as black 
women had to work intensively in manual labour. Second, the slave system harshly discouraged 
male supremacy in Black men.  
 
2 Insignificant coefficient of the interaction term between a dummy of being Black and a dummy of having a 
child under age 6 in a pooled OLS regression with log hourly wage as the dependent variable, using women-
only sample. 
On the other hand, less conservative gender norms in Black households may be a product of 
male supremacy and racial discrimination. First, the working-class version of modern 
manliness is constructed by women's exclusion from paid labour (Melosh, 1993). Powerful 
manhood identity is a political language, and such construction deliberately excluded other 
races, refusing to concede that men of other races were equally manly as white men (Bederman, 
1993). As Bederman explains, under gender and racial hierarchy, the gender identity of white 
men was constructed as self-controlled protectors of women and children, and white women as 
motherly and dedicated to the home. In contrast, non-white men and women were almost 
identical. 
3. Data and methods 
I follow the specification of event study decomposition as Kleven et al. (2019a 2019b, and 
2021). Furthermore, I add individual fixed effects to account for endogenous timing across 
women entering motherhood earlier or later. Therefore, only within-individual variation is 
used. 





𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the labour supply (participation dummy or annual hours worked if participating) 
of individual 𝑖 at event time 𝑡. The first term includes event time dummies, indexed such that 
𝑡 =  0 denotes the year of the arrival of the first child and omits the dummy for 𝑡 =  −1 so 
that each 𝛼′ measures the impact of children each year relative to the year before child arrival. 
The second and third terms include a full set of age and year dummies to control 
nonparametrically for life cycle trends and time trends. This specification is run separately for 
white men, white women, black men and black women.   
Data comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID-CDS) from 1967 to 2017. I 
follow the sample selection criteria of Kleven et al. (2019a) to include only individuals who 
have their first child between the ages of 20 and 45. 
4. Results - Child Penalty by Race 
This section has three main parts. The first part documents substantial differences between 
black and white women in child penalty, defined as the reduction in female labour supply 
following first childbirth. The second part uses the inverse probability weight to construct a 
nearly identical distribution in economic or demographic observables between black and white 
women.  
4.1 Event study analysis 
First, there is a substantial racial difference in child penalty, measured as log annual labour 
income. As shown in Figure 1, the reduction in log annual labour income relative to childbirth 
is significantly smaller for black women, relative to white women. 
Figure 1. Racial difference in child penalty (log annual labour income) 
 
Furthermore, the annual labour income is driven by both extensive margin and intensive margin 
of labour supply. As shown in Figure 2, the reduction in employment probability for white 
women dropped around 30 per cent immediately following her first childbirth, whereas it is 
only around 12 per cent for black women. Moreover, conditional on being in the labour market, 
the child penalty in annual hours worked is substantially different between black and white 
women. The racial difference in child penalty at the intensive margin is around 400 hours 
worked. In addition, such racial difference in child-related reduction in female labour supply 
appears persistent overtime for at least ten years following childbirth. 
Figure 2. Child penalty on female labour supply 
(Extensive margin) employment status 
 
 
(Intensive margin) Annual hours worked 
 
4.2 Use inverse probability weights to control for the distribution of her wage, husband 
labour income and household non-labour income 
Black and white women are likely to have substantial different potential wage, husband labour 
income (including being single or having unemployed husband), and household non-labour 
income. Therefore, I use inverse probability weights to ensure that Black and white women 
have the nearly identical distribution of these three control variables. They are chosen because 
they are the determinants of female labour supply in the unitary household labour supply 
model. 
Household maximise utility from husband's consumption 𝑐1 and leisure (1-ℎ1), wife 
consumption 𝑐2 and leisure (1-ℎ2), subject to the budget constraint that total consumption is 
no more than the total income. 
max
(𝑐1,𝑐2,ℎ1,ℎ2)
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2, 1 − ℎ1, 1 − ℎ2) 
subject to 𝑤1ℎ1 + 𝑤2ℎ2 + 𝑦 ≥ 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 
Therefore, optimal female labour supply is determined by her wage, 𝑤1, or husband wage 
𝑤2, and non-labour income y. 
In addition, I construct the distribution with particular attention to ensure identical mass at 
𝑤2 = 0 and 𝑦 = 0, between Black and white women to consider that black women are more 
likely to be single, have an unemployed husband, and not have any non-labour household 
income. Moreover, all economic variables are adjusted by the consumer price index. 
As shown in Figure 3.a.1, two differences appear in the wage distribution between black and 
white women. First, white women have a higher labour market participation one year before 
childbirth. Second, there are more white women having a high hourly wage compared to black 
women. 
The inverse probability weights are constructed such that employment status and wage 
distribution become identical between black and white women, as shown in Figure 3.a.2.  
Furthermore, there is a substantial difference in non-labour income between black and white 
households, as shown in Figure 2.b.1. Therefore, inverse probability weights are also 
constructed to generate the identical distribution of non-labour income between black and 
white households. 
Husband labour income is also fully controlled for by inverse probability weights. In addition, 
mass at 0 is also constructed identically to control for the share of single women, and the share 
of unemployed husbands, shown in Appendix A1. As expected, there are more black women 
without a husband or with an unemployed husband. In addition, black women's husband has 
systematically lower annual labour income. 
Figure 3. Distribution of economic variables between black and white women  
a. Log hourly wage prior childbirth* 
a1. Without IPW weights 
 
a2. With inverse probability weights 
 
b. Log household non-labour income** 
b1. Without IPW weights 
 
b2. With IPW weights 
 
Note: * Prior child birth is calculated as the average within 3 years before first childbirth. ** Log female wage 
for women unemployed 1 year before childbirth are recoded to have log female wage equal to 0. So, the 
distribution include both employment status and wage distribution. Annual average household non-labour 
income is calculated within 2 years before and 2 years after first childbirth). The distribution does not change 
much when using different period. All economic variables are CPI adjusted. Source: PSID. 
 
Then, I conduct event study analysis using inverse probability weights as probability weights 
in regression. Similar to research on the racial difference in labour supply (Goldin, 1977; 
Boustan and Collins, 2013), controlling for economic observables has virtually no impact on 





Figure 4. Racial difference in child penalty after control for distribution of economic variables 
a. Employment penalty 
 
b. Annual hours worked penalty
 
Note: Sample selection (individuals having first child at age between 20 and 45) . Source: PSID (1967-
2017) 
Figure 5. Racial difference in child penalty after control for distribution of work variables 
a. Employment penalty 
 
b. Annual hours worked penalty
 
Note: Sample selection (individuals having first child at age between 20 and 45) . Source: PSID (1967-
2017) 
4.3 Use Inverse Probability to Control for Maternal Year of Schooling, Occupation and 
Industry 
The child penalty may differ between black and white women due to differences in work related 
preference by occupation, industry or years of schooling. I calculate the inverse probability weight to 
fully construct nearly identical distribution in these factors between black and white women. As shown 
in Figure 5, the racial difference in child penalty has increased after fully controlling for these variables. 
The distribution between black and white women in these variables before and after weighting is shown 
in Appendix A2. 
4.4 Use Inverse Probability to Control for Gender Norms 
Due to data limitation, gender attitude is only measured in 1976 and 1977. Therefore, although fully 
control for racial difference in gender norms, I can only run the analysis with a sub sample of 
individuals whose husband’s gender attitude is measured. As a result, the racial gap in child penalty 
virtually does not change after controlling for husband resistance against wife working does not 
narrow, as shown in Figure 5. 
The distribution in gender norms by race with and without weighing is shown in Appendix A3. 
Figure 5. Racial difference in child penalty after control for distribution of gender norms 
 
4.5 Use Heterogeneity Analysis to Control for Home ownership or Household Structure 
Another way to investigate the determinants of the racial gap in child penalty is to conduct 
heterogeneity to limit the sample to more alike white and black women. 
To investigate if black women worked for necessity, I restrict the sample owning the property 
where they live during the first year after childbirth. So, neither black nor white women in the 
sample were pressured to work to pay for the rent. 
To investigate if the family structure in black households is different such that black women 
have more help in childcare from families, I restrict the sample consisting of households only 
appearing as 3-people households throughout the entire PSID. Three-people family structure 
means that the household never contains other husband or wife relatives(such as siblings, in-
laws, parents) or unrelated people (such as foster children or friends.) 
As shown in Figure 4, controlling for these two factors does not reduce the racial difference in 
child penalty (intensive margin.) In addition, the racial gap in the employment penalty also 
remains unchanged, shown in Appendix A4. 
Figure 4. Heterogeneity analysis (child penalty in annual hours worked) 
a. Households owned property* at childbirth 
 
b. Three-people households only** 
 
Note: Households own the property where they lived in the first year after childbirth. ** Households never contain 
other husband or wife relatives (such as siblings, in-laws, parents) or unrelated people (such as foster children or 
friends.) 
5. Conclusion 
This study shows a striking difference in child penalty between black and white women. Most 
economic, demographic and norm variables do not explain most of the racial gap in child 
penalty. However, household non-labour income can explain some of the long-run differences. 
This suggests an important research question for future research on how the racial wealth gap 
explains the difference in female labour supply by race.  
Another important next step is to understand how racial differences in child penalties in female 
labour supply have contributed to the achievement gap between Black and white children, 
which is well established in the literature. Given findings in this paper, the disadvantage in 
early child development of black children may result from the absence of black women at home 
whose time is arguably the most productive input in child development. 
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Figure A1. Husband labour income 
a. Without weighting 
 
b. with weighting 
 
 
Here, the husband labour income using log transformation after adding value 1. Therefore, women do 
not have a husband or have an unemployed husband will be located at log of husband labour income at 
0. There are two main differences, presented in Figure 2. First, as expected, there are more black women 
having no husband or unemployed husband. Second, white women's husband have systematically 
higher hourly wage. After applying the inverse probability weight, the distribution of husband labour 
income is nearly identical between black and white women. 
Appendix. A2 
Figure A2.1 Wife year of schooling 
a. Without weighting 
 







Figure A2.2 Wife occupation 
a. Without weighting 
 









Figure A2.3 Wife industry 
a. Without weighting 
 








Gender attitude question in interview is “How does your husband feel about (your working/the 
possibility of your working)? Is he very much in favor of it, somewhat in favor of it, neither for nor 
against it, somewhat against it, or very much against it?”  
The answer is valued 1 if it is “Very much in favor”, 2 if it is “Somewhat in favor”, 3 “Neither for nor 
against”, 4 “Somewhat against” and 5 “Very much against”. 
Figure A3. Husband attitude against wife working 
a. Without weighting 
 




Sample consists of homeowners only 
 
Sample consists of three-people households only 
 
 
 
